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Introduction 
 
Like all people, scientists have cognitive capacities which allow them to perceive, interpret 
and react to their environment and to learn from that experience.  Scientists, however, must 
use these capacities in expert ways by formalising the process to include stages such as 
hypothesis generation, testing and critical analysis.  Kuhn, Amsel and O’Loughlin (1988) 
assert that the major achievement that signifies scientific reasoning is the ability to 
differentiate theory and evidence: 
 
the development from lack of differentiation between theory and evidence to their 
full differentiation and coordination reflects mastery of a wide range of skills and 
subskills in scientific thinking that most likely develop gradually through exercise, 
that develop incompletely in most people, and that may be amenable to instruction. 
(p. 9)  
 
However, Kuhn et al. also caution that processes used by children, lay adults and scientists 
may be quite different and that each group goes about its task of understanding the world 
in different ways.  The following discussion will consider various interpretations of the 
process of scientific reasoning and its relationship to problem solving.   
 
Problem solving and reasoning.   
Problem solving involves the scenario in which information or a task is given but no 
strategy is provided in that information which automatically provides a route to a solution 
or heuristic.  Problem solving involves thinking that occurs internally in the cognitive 
structures.  Mayer (1977) described various theories of thinking ranging from 
associationism, rule learning, gestalt, to computer simulation models.  Most people, he 
argued, tend to adopt a style of thinking that best suits their needs.  When the demand 
arises they develop an alternative style and given a problem, most thinkers adopt a 
sequence of strategies that may begin with trial and error. 
 
Various models on general problem solving have been described (Siegler, 1976; Newell & 
Simon, 1972; Klahr & Wallace, 1976; Anderson, 1987; Holyoak & Thagard, 1989; 
Rumelhart, 1989).  The role of problem solving in science education has been discussed by 
Carey (1986), Kuhn (1989, 1993),  Kuhn, Amsel and O’Loughlin (1988), Reif and Larkin 
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(1991).   Klahr and Dunbar (1988) have also identified a general model of scientific 
reasoning based on a dual process of problem solving and concept formation.   
 
Luria's model of problem solving was discussed at length by Crawford (1986).  Luria sees 
problem solving as a creative intellectual process that is dependent on fundamental 
stochastic and dynamic structures.  Simultaneous processing is a major factor at all stages 
of the problem solving process.  Six phases were proposed: 
 
1. The situation or task is perceived by the subject as a problem.  That is, thinking 
only arises when the subject has an appropriate motive when confronted by a 
situation for which he has no ready-made (inborn or habitual) response. 
2. The inhibition of a direct response (impulsivity) and the investigation of the 
problem, analysis of its components, recognition of salient features and correlation 
of one piece of information with another. 
3. The selection of one general schema for performance of the task from a number of 
possible alternatives and the creation of a plan.  Many writers  refer to this stage as 
the selection of a strategy for thinking.  
4. Choice of appropriate methods or specific tactics for implementation of a solution 
strategy.  For example, the selection of an algorithm, from those known by the 
subject, that will be appropriate for use to achieve a solution of a mathematical 
problem.   
5. The use of tactics to achieve a solution.  In school mathematics, this phase usually 
involves the application of well established computation skills.  The organisation 
and maintenance of operational behaviours would be expected to involve the 
function of the frontal lobes of the cortex. 
6. Comparison of the results obtained with the original conditions of the problem.  
Motivation to carry out his stage is closely related to socialisation factors. 
(Crawford 1986  p. 163). 
 
The philosophers of science see two modes of problem solving: induction and deduction 
(Chalmers, 1982).  Through the inductive process of reasoning, understanding is derived 
from the consideration of observable characteristics.  One is able to generalise from facts 
acquired through observation.  Inductive reasoning is represented in thinking by analogy.  
A number of studies have suggested that there are stages in the development of analogical 
reasoning that represent a transition from an inability to recognise second-order 
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relationships to a stage where full analogical reasoning is possible (Sternberg & Powell, 
1983).   
 
Deductive reasoning.  Deductive reasoning is a broad term covering the encoding and 
combination of statements using logical connectives, transitive inference or syllogistic 
reasoning and propositional reasoning.  Deductive reasoning involves the process of 
logically deriving facts, outcomes or consequences from ideas or theories based on the 
formal truth relationships between premises without regard for the empirical or practical 
truth value.  A typical example in physics might be that given the laws of optics one can 
derive an explanation of the cause of rainbows.  Effective reasoning requires the ability to 
develop arguments and assess their validity, to generate and test hypotheses, to judge the 
plausibility of assertions, to identify possible courses of action and to think through the 
consequences of choosing a particular course (Nickerson, 1986).  Inhelder and Piaget 
(1958) researched extensively children's competence in logico-deductive reasoning in its 
many forms and came to the general conclusion that competence required children to be in 
the formal operational period of development allegedly associated with adolescence.   
 
Although the role of pure logic in scientific reasoning as defined by competence in 
traditional syllogisms has been brought into question by some (Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett & 
Oliver, 1986; O’Brien, 1987) the use of syllogisms to probe reasoning remains a field of 
active research (Markovits, 1993; English, 1992).  Goldman (1986) identified two main 
competing theories in defining the role of cognition in deductive reasoning involving 
syllogisms: the mental logic theory and the mental models theory.  The mental logic theory 
assumes that individuals possess a schemata for holding and implementing sets of rules 
that enables them to carry out mental derivations.  The main support for this theory comes 
from Rips (1983) through computer simulations.  Johnson-Laird’s (1983) implementation 
of the mental models theory argues that people interpret premises as perceptions rather 
than verbal associations.  Subjects make associations based on developing or identifying 
analogies between the elements of the premise. 
 
Inductive reasoning.  Reasoning in children has been explored from an inductive 
viewpoint.  The development of scientific understanding is predicated by what DiSessa 
terms phenomenological primitives (1983).  This phenomena is based on Goethe's (1978) 
claim, that has been adopted by the constructivists, that scientific explanation begins with 
common sense observation.  For a child or novice, such observations are isolated and 
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discrete.  Goethe contends that what follows is a process of sorting observations seeking 
more general and fundamental ones to serve as principles leading, at the highest level, to 
abstraction.  However, even the highest level is phenomenological.  DiSessa (1983) argues 
that phenomenological primitives serve as elements of analysis or models, that partly 
explain and provide a link between the memory of an event and understanding of more 
complex or formal ideas.  These primitives, which also appear to be mental representations 
of events or entities, provide the basis for analogical reasoning.   
 
Analogical reasoning, however, is an inductive process in which the thinker transfers or 
generalises from the stored model representation to explain other phenomena (Gentner & 
Gentner, 1983; Gentner, 1989; DeJong, 1989; Halford, 1991).  The construction of an 
analogy necessitates a high information processing load.  Halford (1991) has shown that 
processes involving transitive inference and class inclusion require a higher processing 
load than young children can generally cope with.  However, it has not been established 
whether this is because the child's processing capacity or processing efficiency is limiting.   
 
The relationship between inductive, deductive reasoning and analogical reasoning as seen 
by Michalski (1989) is shown in Figure 1.  The process of recognising the existence of an 
analogy between stored knowledge and an event is intrinsically inductive; whereas 
according to Michalski, the process of deriving inferences about the analogue using 
analogical mapping is deductive.  That is, the construction of the analogy which unifies the 
base and target systems is an inductive process but the use of the analogy is a deductive 
exercise. 
 
 
Figure 1 Types of inference.  Inductive inferences produce explanations or generalisations that 
crisply or softly imply original facts.  The original facts are deductive consequences of the 
 Page 5 Australian Science Educators’ Research Association Conference Lismore 1993. 
generalisations.  Crispness/softness dimension refers to the strength of the inference with crispness 
reflecting truth-preservation and softness implying plausibility. (After Michalski, 1989). 
 
The visual aspect of reasoning.   A number of authors have argued that thinking skills must 
be taught, and in particular, De Bono (1976) emphasises visual expression as a key to the 
development of thinking skills.  In real-life, most problems are experienced in the context 
of interaction with the environment.  In school, problems are presented in written or verbal 
form.  Children are required to be able to read and understand the words, interpret any 
diagrams (usually two dimensional representations of three dimensional space), imagine or 
visualise the situation being described, to process the information and its relationships, and 
finally, to communicate what they understand.  Indeed Piaget, (Ginsburg and Opper, 1969) 
emphasised that the child moves from an egocentric 'world' to a much more symbolic form.  
This would seem particularly true in the traditional schooling system where life 
experiences devolve to verbal and written expression.  Crawford (1986) in an extensive 
review of problem solving highlights the role of metacognition, executive control and self 
regulation.  She also identifies an implicit assumption in much of the literature that abstract 
thinking is associated with verbal but not visual information processing. 
 
The role of spatial ability in problem-solving is far from being clearly defined.  However, 
positive correlations between imagery elements and problem solving performance were 
found in studies where the problems represented practical, open ended tasks requiring 
some creative thinking and the information given involved more visual presentations 
(Kaufmann, 1979).  One model explaining syllogistic reasoning has developed from a 
spatial framework that suggests that people, at least in part, represent the terms of a linear 
syllogism in the form of a spatial array (DeSoto, London & Handel, 1965 ; Sternberg, 
1980).  
 
Hawkins, Pea, Glick and Scribner (1984), Dias and Harris (1988), and English (1992)  
have investigated the role of context and experience on deductive reasoning with similar 
results.  In the context of play, in a pretend world, these workers found that young children 
(4 - 7 year old) recognised that their normal empirical knowledge did not apply and that 
they could then recourse to deduction.  Sternberg asserts that children of all ages use a 
mixture of linguistic and spatial representations and processes in the solution of transitive-
inference problems.  The balance of processes probably depend on the context of the 
problem and the extent of working memory capacity.  This is a contentious issue since 
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Inhelder and Piaget (1958) asserted that children below 11-12 years of age are incapable of 
abstract reasoning.  
 
The Luria model of information processing.   
A theory that has had a significant impact on intelligence research is that of Luria (1973).  
Luria described three principal functional units or blocks, defined by the role they assume 
in overall cognitive processing, as elements of cognitive function.  An arousal and 
attention unit that comprises the reticular system and includes parts of the hippocampus, 
limbic system and brain stem regulates tone and waking.  Secondly, he postulated an 
information gathering, processing and storage unit involving the parietal, temporal and 
occipital regions of the neo-cortex and underlying subcortical regions with connections to 
the thalamus.   Thirdly, he identified a system that involves programming, regulation and 
verification which includes the frontal lobe networked to other regions of the cortex.  An 
important feature is that each of these functional units is organised in levels that reflect 
their particular role.  These levels relate to the function of, firstly, receiving and 
transmitting sensory input, secondly, processing and coding of the input, and thirdly, 
integrating the working of various analysers.   
 
Luria postulated that it is in the tertiary zone of the second functional unit that the 
conversion of concrete experiences into abstract thinking occurs.  Luria's original model 
has provided a framework for the development of a model of information processing by 
Das and colleagues (1986).  Luria hypothesised that both verbal and non-verbal 
information can be processed either simultaneously or successively.  In simultaneous 
synthesis each piece of information is immediately accessible in relation to another.  
Successive synthesis involves the processing of information in a time dependent sequential 
mode.  Das's model postulates four basic components: sensory input; sensory register; 
central processing unit; and a behavioural output.  Sensory input in either successive or 
simultaneous mode is received by the relevant receptor(s) and stored in the sensory buffer.  
The information is then serially despatched to the central processing unit under the 
orchestration of the three principal functional units postulated by Luria.  The central 
processing unit comprises two modules: a mode processor and a decision-making 
processor.  The mode processor synthesises information into simultaneous, quasi-spatial 
format or a temporally organised format irrespective of the mode of information 
presentation to the sensory receptor.  The way information is processed depends on the 
individual, their level of attention, the nature of the task, and their interactions.  
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Functionally, the occipital and parietal lobes are the sites for simultaneous synthesis while 
the temporal and fronto-temporal regions are implicated in successive synthesis.  The 
output unit is influenced by the planning and decision making processor and may produce 
either sequential or simultaneous responses.  Both forms of activity can occur in processing 
perceptual, mnestic, and intellectual functions.   
 
Conclusions.   
Problem solving is viewed as an important part of mathematics and science education.  The 
Cockcroft Report (1982) recommended problem solving as an important area in the study 
of mathematics emphasising that children need experience in applying thinking skills not 
only to familiar everyday situations but also to the solution of problems that are not exact 
repetitions of exercises which have already been practised (pp. 73, 94).  The American 
National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM, 1989), has listed "mathematics as 
reasoning" and "mathematics as problem-solving" as two of its major curriculum standards 
for mathematics in grades K to 12.  Students, need to be proficient in accessing and 
processing information, critical thought and to be able to make inferences and predictions 
based on evidence and logical application of thought.   
 
The problem-solving approach to science teaching has been advocated as an outcome of 
the "discovery learning" movement of Bruner (1961).  The approach ideally begins by 
presenting to a student a meaningful situation requiring the student to seek further 
information by inquiry or data collection and analysing this information to develop a 
hypothesis or solution to the problem.  Scientists solving a problem use heuristics or step-
by-step processes that they know through previous experience will lead to a successful 
outcome.  Students on the other hand do not have this experience and must develop the 
heuristic.  Bodner and McMillen (1986) identify a key step in problem solving crucial to 
beginning students. They describe a "holistic or gestalt stage" where relevant information 
is "disembedded" from the problem and the elements of the problem are restructured to fit 
the students knowledge base.  The ability to achieve this is related to the cognitive style of 
the student and may be favoured by input from the spatial domain.  Rowe (1986) elegantly 
expresses the problem: 
 
The person who finds it difficult to perceive an item, object, idea, etc. as separate from 
the surrounding field, that is, a relatively field-dependent person, is likely to 
experience difficulties of a similar kind in problem solving, where the solution 
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requires a restructuring of the task, for example the removal of some critical 
component from the context in which it is presented, and its utilization in another 
context. (p. 90). 
 
This study was an examination of the performance of children on a series of process 
oriented questions and relates that performance to measures of cognitive processing 
defined in terms of the Luria model of information processing.  Specifically, this study 
posed the following questions. 
• To what extent does simultaneous and successive synthesis in children facilitate 
problem solving?   
• Is there an interaction between these factors in their prediction of competence? 
 
 
METHOD 
Subjects 
This study was part of a larger study of logical reasoning in which over 324 children drawn 
from 16 metropolitan primary schools have been tested (Watters, 1992) .  In this phase of 
the study 64 of these children were administered the inductive reasoning task and 25 of 
these children administered the Scientific Puzzles Task.    
 
Instruments 
Simultaneous and successive synthesis.  Subjects were administered a test battery that 
measures simultaneous and successive processing and selective attention.  The tests were 
developed by Fitzgerald (1971)  and used by his students Green (1977), Angus (1984) and 
Crawford (1986) and others (Hunt & Randhawa, 1983).  The tests include: Matrix Test A 
and Matrix Test B which measure simultaneous processing; Number Span Test, Word 
String Test and a Letter Span Test which measure successive processing.  Raven's 
Coloured Progressive Matrices which was shown by Das (1972) to load mostly on 
simultaneous processing in normal Canadian children completed the battery.  
Administration and scoring were as follows.   The letter span, word span and number span 
tests comprised 15 lists of randomly arranged lists of letters, words and numbers.  No 
element was repeated in each list and the length varied from three to seven elements.  List 
size was also randomly arranged.  The elements were dictated with a pause of one second 
between each.   The subjects were required to memorise each list and to write the list in the 
given sequence on an answer sheet.  At the completion of each list, the researcher 
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immediately indicated to the subjects  to commence writing by saying "write".   Credit for 
each response was given where the subject reported elements in the correct sequence and 
not for the absolute number recalled.  The matrix tests involved students memorising a 
pattern arranged within a nine dot matrix and presented on a large cardboard poster held by 
the researcher at the front of the group.   Subjects were given eight seconds to view the  
pattern and then requested to draw the pattern from memory within a blank dot matrix on 
an answer sheet.  In Matrix B, the subjects were required to mentally rotate the image 
through 180 degrees and present that rotated image as their answer.  The order of 
administration of tests was varied without effect. 
 
Science puzzle.  This instrument comprised 19 questions drawn from a range of sources 
which tested a range of science process skills.  An example of a typical question is shown 
in Figure 2. 
 
 Question 12.  
 
The table below shows details of a test conducted on four different brands of household 
cleaners. 
 
BRAND NAME LIQUID OR 
SPRAY 
REMOVES 
PAINT 
REMOVES PEN 
STAINS 
REMOVES 
GREASE 
Wipeoff Liquid No Yes Yes 
Cleanout Spray Yes Yes No 
Nomess Liquid No No No 
Trueclean Spray Yes Yes Yes 
 
You have grease and pen stains on a painted desk top.  You do not want to remove paint but want 
the grease and pen stains removed.  
 
Which brand of cleaner would you use?  
( A ) Wipeoff 
( B ) Cleanout 
( C ) Nomess 
( D ) Trueclean 
Figure 2 Sample Problem 
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Inductive reasoning task.  This reasoning task, herein referred to as the Creature Card 
Task, involved a 15 item test (see Figure 3) based on the ESS Creature Cards Activity  
(Elementary Science Study, 1974).  The subjects were required to undertake an 
identification and an application task as part of this activity.  The creature card activity, as 
originally used in the ESS program, involved presenting to the subject a set of between five 
and seven drawings which were described as all being some imaginary creature such as a 
gruffle.  A further set of drawings was presented with a label indicating that none of those 
particular drawings was a gruffle.  Finally, a third set of drawings was presented with a 
label requesting the subject to identify which of this set of drawings was a gruffle.   
 
In our study, each subject received a booklet containing, on a separate page, the set of 
drawings representing each imaginary creature and the set of drawings representing non-
examples.  Individual items involved classes of animals which were graded in difficulty in 
that from one up to three attributes were necessary to define membership.  A booklet of 
answer sheets was provided in which the third set of mixed creatures and non-creatures 
was drawn.  The subjects were required to circle letters representing the correct responses 
and were awarded one point for every correct choice and were deducted one point for 
every incorrectly identified case.   No penalty was given for failing to identify an example.  
A total score of 45 on the Creature Card scale was possible. 
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Figure 3 Item from Creature Card Task 
 
Procedures 
Testing was undertaken in three sessions.  The Luria tests were administered in two group 
sessions of 40 minutes duration on separate days.  The scores on the six tests (letter span, 
number span, word span, matrix A, matrix B and Ravens CPM) were subjected to a 
principal axis common factor analysis.  The resulting factor solution was subjected to a 
varimax rotation with Kaiser normalisation and standardised factor scores calculated for 
each subject.   
 
The Creature Card Task was also administered during the first session.  Students were 
allowed to complete this task at their own pace.  The Science Puzzle was administered 
during the second group session and was also completed without time limit.  The Raven's 
CPM was administered individually according to the Raven manual.   
 
  
RESULTS 
Complete data were obtained from 29 subjects out of the total population of 176.  Data for 
individual tasks were as follows:  Creature Card task (M = 30.45, SD = 13.0 n = 137) and 
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Science Puzzle task (M = 11.12, SD = 3.68, n = 71).  For the complete data set the mean 
score for the Creature Card task was 29.0 (SD 11.3) and a mean score of 11.93 (SD 3.74) 
for the Science Puzzle.  The Creature Card task possessed an alpha reliability coefficient of 
.83.  The total population comprised 48 per cent girls.    
 
The two factors, simultaneous and successive synthesis, predicted from the Luria model, 
with eigenvalues > 1, were clearly identified and accounted for over 60 percent of the 
variance in the data.  The number span test is the test most dependent on successive 
processing and the matrix B test is a good measure of simultaneous processing.  These 
results are consistent with those found by Angus (1984). 
 
 
Table 1 
Intercorrelations among luria factors and achievement on reasoning tasks 
Correlations: SUCC SIM Creature 
Card 
Science 
Puzzle 
     
SUCCessive synthesis 1.00    
     
SIMultaneous synthesis -.12 1.00   
     
Creature Card .18 .54** 1.00  
     
Science Puzzle .17 .70** .69** 1.00 
** p < 0.001  
 
The intercorrelations for the Creature Card scores, Science Puzzle test and the Luria factors 
for simultaneous and successive synthesis are presented in Table 1. The correlation of 
simultaneous synthesis factor scores with Creature Card scores and Science Puzzle scores 
are significant (p < .001).  The correlation between simultaneous synthesis and successive 
synthesis is close to zero as is expected from the factor analysis.  Stepwise regression 
analysis with Creature Card scores as the dependent variable indicated that simultaneous 
synthesis scores accounted for 29 percent of the variance (F = 11.6, df 1, 27) p < .001 with 
successive synthesis making no significant contribution.  Similarly, a stepwise regression 
analysis with Science Puzzle scores as the dependent variable indicated that simultaneous 
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synthesis accounted for 49 percent of the variance (F = 25.7, df 1,27) p = < .001 with no 
significant contribution from successive synthesis scores. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The results of this study indicate that the Luria model incorporating information processing 
dimensions of simultaneous and successive synthesis predicts significant achievement by 
10-year-old children in tasks identifiable with scientific reasoning.  These results 
compliment previous findings with 7-year-old children (Watters, 1992), 10 year-old-
children (Watters & English, 1993) and with Grade 12 children (Angus, 1984) where it 
was shown that subjects with high simultaneous processing scores were proficient at 
syllogistic reasoning.  Despite the substantial differences in the nature of the two tasks 
their solution appears to depend on similar cognitive processes.  The Science Puzzle task is 
complex in that some questions involved interpretation of visually presented problems, 
others required interpretation of tables or graphs while some were traditional verbal 
questions typical of many science quizzes.    
 
In reading and writing Harris and Wachs (1986) have found relationships between 
successive processing and sentence errors.  That is the construction of sentences and 
presumably the ability to read the sentence is a successive process.  However, 
simultaneous processing appeared to be involved in forming links between sentences and 
paragraphs and developing comprehension.  On the other hand, the Creature Card task was 
purely perceptual in presentation.  The instructions were given verbally and the children 
were given several examples until they were confident that they understood the task.  The 
subject in solving this task would scan the prototypical creatures, to generate a 
representation of an exemplary member of the class and then to scan the non-members 
seeking attributes which would eliminate particular cases from class membership.  Because 
these are fantasy creatures, the subject has no knowledge base to activate and draw upon 
and so is dependent entirely on the perceptual cues and a novel solution strategy.  The 
strong correlation between the identification of the features of a class member and the 
ability to apply this representation by creating and drawing their own creature with all the 
necessary attributes reinforces the contention that the subject generates a spatial image or 
schemata which is holistically structured.  The correlation between success at the Creature 
Card Task and the Luria Simultaneous synthesis factor implies a neuropsychological 
mechanism for the generation of this schemata. 
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Clearly neither of these problems demanded a high conceptual knowledge base.  Given that 
most of the information to solve the Science Puzzle problems is contained within the 
questions one can assume that conceptual knowledge is not a dominant feature in the 
child's ability to solve the problem.  This assertion is reinforced by the correlation between 
the two reasoning tasks.   
 
Simultaneous processing involves information processing in a way that allows linkages to 
be made independent of temporal limitations.  At the perceptual level this is synonymous 
with spatial processing.  At higher cognitive levels is may be the neurological basis for the 
generation of mental models (Johnston-Laird, 1983; Gentner, & Gentner, 1983), of mental 
capacity (Halford, 1991; diSessa, 1983). 
 
The practical implication of this work lies in the anecdotal observations and discussions 
with teachers that accompanied the collection of these data.  The possession of the 
orthogonally related simultaneous and successive processing skills is distributed across the 
population.  Some children are high in both dimensions others have extreme distributions 
of levels.  A recurring feature of children who are high in the simultaneous dimension is 
the unusual relationship they have to classroom activities.  Many of these children, 
particularly if they are low on the successive dimension, are described by their teachers as 
being of apparent high ability but bored or disinterested in the normal classroom activities.  
They often possess extraordinary interests in technology and science and they are creative 
thinkers but fail to perform in routine activities.  It would appear that if their information 
processing mechanisms are limited to one dimension they may be severely disadvantaged 
if the mode of delivery of information is inappropriate.  Given that most classrooms tend to 
be oriented towards verbal and sequential presentation of information it is not surprising 
that many children with an interest and aptitude for science fail to progress. 
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